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Several recent studies have tackled the issue of optimal network immunization, by providing efficient criteria
to identify key nodes to be removed in order to break apart a network, thus preventing the occurrence of extensive
epidemic outbreaks. Yet, although the efficiency of those criteria has been demonstrated also in empirical
networks, preventive immunization is rarely applied to real world scenarios, where the usual approach is the a
posteriori attempt to contain epidemic outbreaks using quarantine measures. Here we compare the efficiency of
prevention with that of quarantine in terms of the tradeoff between the number of removed and saved nodes on
both synthetic and empirical topologies. We show how, consistent with common sense, but contrary to common
practice, in many cases preventing is better than curing: depending on network structure, rescuing an infected
network by quarantine could become inefficient soon after the first infection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks provide a convenient framework for investigating
epidemics, with nodes corresponding to potential hosts of the
infectious agent, and links between nodes indicating potential
routes for the spread of the infection [1]. Much effort has been
spent on elaborating efficient procedures to immunize a net-
work [2–4]. A novel and effective approach has been recently
proposed [5], based on the concept of optimal percolation.
The idea is that, in order to confine the infection and avoid
large outbreaks, one must delete, in the contact network, the
minimal number of nodes sufficient to break the system into
small, isolated fragments, with no giant component.
Although interesting from a theoretical perspective, the
idea of preventively reducing the risk of epidemics by remov-
ing nodes from a network can sometimes be impractical. For
example, the modification of a transportation network [6] has
deep economic and societal implications, apart from the ob-
vious technical difficulties. In other scenarios, ethical aspects
add to the implementation challenges. For example, it would
be very controversial to designate specific individuals in the
population for mandatory vaccination. Similarly, in a spa-
tial network [7] that maps infection pathways for agricultural
pests, it would be very difficult to require costly preventive
actions from some farmers only, especially in the case of a
purely hypothetical threat [8].
In addition, different kinds of threat would modify the un-
derlying network, hence calling for different immunization
strategies, not only in terms of how to immunize a node, but
also in terms of the identity of nodes to be immunized. Con-
sidering the last example, a network of infection pathways for
an agricultural pest can be generated by connecting all pairs
of crops within a certain threshold distance, representing how
far a pathogen can spread from one crop to another in a single
step [8]. This distance, however, depends on several aspects
related to the pathogen’s features (such as the flight distance
of its vectors), so that the same crops in a given region may be
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arranged in a particular network topology for a certain disease,
and in a very different one for another. In turn, this would lead
to the identification of different sets of critical nodes.
The discovery of a serious disease in the first phases of its
spread often leaves no other choice than to sacrifice individual
interests in the hope of preventing an outbreak with a coor-
dinated action. From a theoretical perspective, the simple re-
moval of infected nodes is a straightforward, trivial solution to
the problem of stopping an epidemic. However, in real-world
scenarios, due to infection latency (the interval between the
time a host becomes infectious, and the time it shows signs
of disease), it is common practice to try to isolate the infected
nodes from the rest of the network by also taking action on the
surrounding nodes. For example, in the case of the spread of
disease in plants, it is usual procedure to eliminate all the sus-
ceptible hosts close to an infected one [8, 9]. Similarly, in the
case of human diseases, a typical intervention is the quaran-
tine of asymptomatic individuals that have had contacts with
infected nodes (see, for example, [10]).
Some recent studies have investigated various aspects re-
lated to the efficiency of different quarantine strategies. Nian
and Wang [11] considered “high-risk” immunization (more
properly, quarantine) of susceptible neighbors of infected in-
dividuals, occurring with a probability δ, and found that in-
creasing δ reduces the epidemic threshold of the Susceptible-
Infected-Removed-Susceptible (SIRS) dynamics. Hasegawa
and Nemoto [12] studied numerically and analytically a
similar strategy for Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) dy-
namics, finding it more efficient at suppressing epidemics
than random or acquaintance immunization. Pereira and
Young [13] investigated, for Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible
(SIS) dynamics, the effect of the time period between the in-
fection of an individual and its isolation.
Apart from the difficulties that may arise in the practical
implementation of the two approaches (i.e. preventive immu-
nization vs. quarantine), a crucial question to be answered is:
under which circumstances is a preventive immunization strat-
egy preferable to a post-outbreak (quarantine) intervention?
To avoid confusion (the same terms are often used with differ-
ent meanings in the literature), let us specify that with quaran-
tine we intend the post-outbreak removal of nodes which have
been in contact with infectious individuals. Immunization is
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2instead the pre-outbreak removal of nodes based on some a
priori prevention strategy.
In this paper, we analyze the question by comparing the
fraction of nodes saved using preventive immunization against
the fraction of nodes that can be saved if quarantine is imple-
mented at different times after the beginning of the outbreak.
We mainly focus on the conservative concept of “complete”
quarantine, i.e., we assume that the quarantine strategy is im-
plemented by removing all susceptible neighbors of infected
nodes. Moreover we assume that outbreak detection is imme-
diate and perfect: we always know which nodes are infectious.
In reality early outbreak detection is a nontrivial problem for
which clever strategies can be devised [14].
We assess whether and when preventing an outbreak by im-
munization is a preferable strategy (in terms of saving more
individuals) to attempting to rescue an infected network by
quarantine. We consider a very simple theoretical framework
(in terms of epidemic dynamics, network topologies and as-
sumptions about the cost of immunization, quarantine, or be-
ing hit by the infection) with the aim of grasping the main fea-
tures of the problem. In contrast to previous approaches, the
preventive immunization strategy considered here is based on
the recently introduced concept of optimal percolation.
The overall resulting message of our study is that quaran-
tine may be a viable alternative only if enacted immediately
after the start of the outbreak. If the implementation is not
prompt enough, then quarantine becomes highly inefficient,
as it stops the epidemic at the price of removing many more
nodes than those that would have been removed by preventive
immunization. In some cases it may even be more conve-
nient to let the disease propagate freely rather than applying
a quarantine measure. These conclusions hold very strongly
for networks possessing the small-world property (i.e. having
small diameter). They hold in a weaker form for networks
with large diameter (such as planar graphs): in that case the
number of infected nodes grows more slowly and, as a conse-
quence, quarantine remains convenient for longer times.
The “complete” quarantine makes sense in many real world
scenarios where the topology of the contact pattern is not
known. This applies, for example, to the case of quaran-
tining people who have come into contact with a dangerous
pathogen: although they clearly belong to some sort of social
network, its structure would be, in most cases, elusive. Nev-
ertheless, when the contact pattern is known, it is possible to
devise a more refined quarantine strategy, which removes a
node only if this saves on average more than one other node.
We investigate this aspect by introducing an improved quar-
antine strategy that takes into account the average effect, on
the epidemic process, of whether or not a node is quarantined.
We show that the set of nodes that should be quarantined to
halt an epidemic can be significantly smaller than the set of
healthy neighbors surrounding infected nodes. Nevertheless,
even this improved quarantine strategy is not more efficient
than preventive immunization.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section II
we define the epidemic dynamics considered, the synthetic
topologies of the underlying interaction pattern, and give de-
tails on the different approaches to be compared. We then
compare the quarantine strategy with two alternative courses
of action: no intervention (Section III) and preventive immu-
nization (Section IV). Section V reports the same type of anal-
ysis for two real-world topologies. The next Section is de-
voted to the presentation and performance evaluation of the
improved quarantine strategy. The last Section contains some
concluding remarks, and an outlook about future work.
II. EPIDEMIC MODEL AND COUNTERMEASURES
We consider the Independent Cascade Model, a parallel im-
plementation of the SIR dynamics, the simplest model for the
spreading of a pathogen conferring permanent immunity [15].
Each individual sits on a node of a network and can be in one
of three states: susceptible (S), infected (I) or removed (R).
The total number of individuals is N . At a given time step,
a list of infected nodes is created and each node in the list
tries to infect each of his/her susceptible neighbors: each at-
tempt is successful with probability p. After all nodes in the
list have been considered, they all recover (i.e. with proba-
bility 1) switching to state R. Time is increased by 1 and the
next iteration begins with the compilation of the list of newly
infected nodes: p is the only parameter of the dynamics. In
the initial configuration a single randomly selected node is
infected, all others being susceptible. In a finite system the
dynamics unavoidably reach a final absorbing configuration
with no infective nodes: all individuals are either untouched
by the epidemic (in state S) or are recovered (state R) after
having been infected. The fraction R of recovered nodes in
the final state plays the role of the order parameter: for small
values of p the epidemic reaches only a small number of indi-
viduals around the initial seed (R is close to 0 for large sys-
tems); for large p instead an extensive set of individuals is
reached by the infection, so that R is finite in large systems.
The two regimes are separated by a critical value (the epi-
demic threshold pc) distinguishing for N → ∞ between ex-
tensive spreading R(p) > 0 for p > pc and small-scale local
spreading R(p) → 0 for p ≤ pc. We consider two classes
of synthetic networks representing the static contact pattern
among individuals. On the one hand there are low-diameter
networks (i.e. having the small-world property), represented
by Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs or by scale-free networks with degree
distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ with γ = 3 and kmin = 3, built
using the uncorrelated configuration model [16]. The network
size is in all cases N = 105. The average degree is, unless
specified otherwise, 〈k〉 = 5 (〈k〉 ≈ 5.01 for the scale-free
network). The epidemic threshold is, with very good approx-
imation, pc = 〈k〉 /[
〈
k2
〉 − 〈k〉] [17]. On the other hand we
also consider another type of network, which does not possess
the small-world property: a random geometric graph, built in
the two-dimensional square of unit size by connecting nodes
at euclidean distance smaller than d = 0.00395 (〈k〉 ≈ 5.04).
In this topology the diameter grows asymptotically as a power
of the number of nodes [18], as in a regular lattice.
Most of our work regards the comparison between a pre-
ventive immunization protocol and a quarantine strategy im-
plemented only after the outbreak has started.
3The preventive immunization is based on the concept of op-
timal percolation proposed by Morone and Makse [5]1. Ex-
tensive epidemic outbreaks in a network are possible only if
a giant component (i.e. a cluster of connected nodes cover-
ing a finite fraction of the structure) is present. Otherwise,
only small outbreaks can occur, even for extremely infective
pathogens (p = 1). Therefore, by removing a number of
nodes sufficient to dismantle the giant component it is pos-
sible to prevent large outbreaks. By means of different strate-
gies [5, 20–22] it is possible to reduce this number to values
close to the theoretical minimum, thus providing an optimal
preventive immunization. If the removal of a fraction nr of
nodes destroys the giant component one can consider that a
fraction nOP = 1 − nr of nodes is effectively saved from
infection. In Appendix A we provide details on how nOP is
determined in our study.
The alternative strategy to contain the epidemic and save
individuals is quarantine, which is intended here as the re-
moval at a given time step of all susceptible neighbors of all
infected nodes. This procedure leads to the immediate end of
the epidemic, leaving a fraction nQ of the nodes saved, i.e. not
reached by the contagion. In practice, it is possible to calcu-
late the fraction nQ for each time step as the epidemic unfolds
by simply counting the number of susceptible nodes which are
not direct neighbors of infected nodes.
In the following we compare the fraction of nodes saved by
quarantine with the fraction of those saved by optimal perco-
lation or not reached by the epidemic in the absence of any
intervention. The underlying assumption is that immunizing
a node or quarantining it has the same cost of the node be-
ing infected. This might be an appropriate scenario for, say,
an incurable deadly tree disease, for which immunization or
quarantine both imply the physical felling of the tree. In other
cases where the cost of the different actions is not the same,
the analysis is more complicated, and beyond the scope of this
paper.
III. COMPARISON BETWEEN QUARANTINE AND NO
INTERVENTION
The first question we address is whether a quarantine strat-
egy is any better than doing nothing. The answer to this ques-
tion is not completely trivial: for small values of the spread-
ing probability p, the epidemic soon becomes extinct spon-
taneously, touching a very limited number of individuals; a
quarantine intervention in such a case implies the removal of
more individuals than those likely to be reached by the epi-
demic. For larger values of p it’s a matter of timeliness: if
the intervention is quick enough, quarantine may be useful;
otherwise, it is more costly than leaving the epidemic sponta-
neously evolve and disappear.
1 Notice that, despite the formulation of the original paper, optimal percola-
tion is a strategy for minimizing (not for maximizing) spreading in a net-
work [19].
This is confirmed in Fig. 1, where we plot the ratio between
the fraction nQ of nodes saved by the quarantine strategy and
the fraction nNI = 1 − R(t → ∞) of nodes which are
not reached by the infection in the absence of any interven-
tion. Unsurprisingly, it turns out that for p up to the epidemic
threshold quarantine is never convenient: it removes more in-
dividuals than those that would be hit by the freely evolving
epidemics. For larger values of p, quarantining may be very
useful, but only if promptly implemented: for example, for an
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph and p = 0.3, the implementation of quar-
antine actually saves more individuals than those that would
have survived with no-intervention, only if applied as long as
R < 0.12. For a scale-free network, the effect is even more
noticeable. A different scenario applies instead for the random
geometric graph. In that case, above the threshold (which is
of the order of 0.8). the ratio nQ/nNI remains very large up
to values of R close to 1: quarantine is more convenient than
no intervention practically at any time during the epidemic.
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN QUARANTINE AND
PREVENTIVE IMMUNIZATION
We now evaluate the efficiency of a quarantine procedure
compared to that of a preventive immunization strategy based
on optimal percolation. In practice, the latter is implemented
by removing a fraction 1 − nOP of the nodes, breaking the
network into small clusters so that any outbreak cannot grow
large, (see Appendix A for details). In particular, we com-
pare the global fraction nOP of nodes saved by applying the
preventive immunization strategy with the fraction nQ saved
by applying the quarantine strategy. Also in this case, the ef-
ficiency of quarantine depends on its timeliness, i.e. on the
value of R at the time it is applied. Fig. 2 shows that, for
the two small-world networks, nQ decays very rapidly below
nOP : unless applied in the very early stages of the epidemic,
quarantine is less efficient than preventive immunization. The
only exception to this rule occurs for small values of p: in
such cases the epidemic spontaneously becomes extinct af-
ter relatively short times, so that preventive immunization is
never more efficient. Again, the effect is more dramatic when
the topology is scale-free: quarantine becomes highly incon-
venient as soon as only a few percent of the population have
been hit by the epidemics. For the random geometric graph,
the effect is once again considerably milder. The ratio decays
linearly with R with the same slope for any value of p. Hence
the initial window for an efficient quarantine intervention has
the same width independent from p.
A qualitative understanding of the phenomenology is
straightforward. Starting from the initial seed the epidemics
reaches at time t nodes at distance t − 1 from the seed. In a
network with small-world property the number of these nodes
grows exponentially, approximately as [p(
〈
k2
〉
/ 〈k〉−1)]t−1.
In few steps the whole population is reached and hence the
application of quarantine is highly ineffective, apart from the
very first moments of the spreading process. In a planar
network instead the same quantity grows much more slowly
(quadratically) in time. Hence quarantine remains effective
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FIG. 1. (color online) (a) Ratio between the fraction of nodes nQ saved by quarantine and the fraction of nodes nNI not reached by the
infection in the absence of any intervention as a function of the fraction R of nodes recovered at the time the quarantine is implemented. The
network is an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph with N = 105 nodes. The curves are for growing values (bottom to top) of the spreading probability p. The
dashed line indicates when the ratio is 1, i.e. the value discriminating between convenient quarantine (ratio > 1) and inconvenient quarantine
(ratio < 1). (b) The same plot for a scale-free network with γ = 3. (c) The same plot for a random geometric graph. For this figure (and in all
the others) we performed 10000 realizations of the process. Solid lines are average values computed over 100 intervals (of width 0.01), while
the shaded areas around them are the variations between the minimum and the maximum in 1000 intervals.
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FIG. 2. (color online) (a) Ratio between the fraction nQ of nodes saved by quarantine and the fraction of nodes nOP saved by preventive
immunization, as a function of the fraction R of nodes in state R when quarantine is applied. The network is an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph with
N = 105 nodes. The curves are for growing values (top to bottom) of the spreading probability p. The dashed line indicates when the ratio
is 1, i.e. the value discriminating between convenient quarantine (ratio > 1) and inconvenient quarantine (ratio < 1). (b) The same plot for a
scale-free network with γ = 3. (c) The same plot for a random geometric graph.
up to considerably longer times.
It is possible to analytically estimate, in both scenarios, the
value R∗ after which the quarantine strategy becomes less ef-
ficient than preventive immunization.
For the random regular network, given the quasi planar
structure, the set of removed nodes forms approximately a cir-
cle around the seed, its radius growing over time. Infected
nodes form a ring sitting at the boundary of the circle and
nodes to be quarantined another ring, surrounding the first.
For this reason the fraction I of infected nodes is proportional
to
√
R and the same the fraction Q of nodes to be quaran-
tined. As soon as the number of removed nodes is of the order
of a few dozens, I and Q can be neglected with respect to R.
Hence the fraction of saved nodes nQ is
nQ = 1−R− I −Q ≈ 1−R (1)
This formula fully explains the linear behavior and the lack of
dependence on p observed in Fig. 2(c). The values after which
quarantine is inefficient is R∗ = 1− nOP .
The derivation of the same relation for locally small-world
(locally tree-like) networks is more involved. A calculation
based on the heterogeneous mean-field (HMF) approximation
for SIR dynamics, is presented in Appendix B, yielding:
nQ(R) = 1−
(
1 +
1
τ
〈
k2
〉
〈k〉
)
R, (2)
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FIG. 3. Comparison between analytical predictions (Eq. (4)) and
simulation results for the fraction R∗ of recovered nodes after which
quarantine becomes less convenient than preventive immunization.
The dashed line indicates perfect equality. Simulations are per-
formed on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) networks with various values of the
average degree 〈k〉 and on a scale-free (SF) network. Error bars are
not shown when smaller than symbols size. System size isN = 105.
where
τ =
1
p 〈k2〉 / 〈k〉 − (p+ 1) . (3)
By equating this expression to nOP we obtain
R∗ =
1− nOP
1 + 1τ
〈k2〉
〈k〉
. (4)
In Fig. 3, we compare this analytical prediction with the re-
sults obtained from numerical simulations on both ER and
scale-free networks. The agreement is satisfactory, also con-
sidering the known discrepancies between HMF theory for
SIR and simulation results [1, 23]. We note that the value of
R∗ is reduced as the average degree of homogeneous networks
is increased or as the network becomes more heterogeneous.
In Fig. 2 preventive immunization is implemented by op-
timal percolation, i.e., by removing the minimum number of
nodes sufficient to destroy the giant component of the net-
work, thus precluding the possibility of endemic outbreaks,
even in the extreme hypothesis that the transmission probabil-
ity is p = 1. If one has information about the actual value of p
it is possible to use it in the preventive immunization strategy.
In that case, one can compare nQ with the average fraction of
nodes saved, given that the spreading probability is p. Clearly
n(p) ≥ nOP [with n(p = 1) = nOP ]. See Appendix A for
details about the calculation of n(p). The ratio of the fractions
of saved nodes with the two strategies (“informed” preventive
immunization vs quarantine) is displayed in Fig. 4. In this
scenario, where p is known a priori, the observed patterns are
very similar to those observed assuming p = 1; the higher
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FIG. 4. (color online) Ratio between the fraction nQ of nodes saved
by quarantine and the fraction of nodes nOP saved by “informed”
preventive immunization (i.e. with p known a priori), as a function
of the fraction of nodes removed when quarantine is applied. The
network is an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph with N = 105 nodes. The curves
are for growing values (top to bottom) of the spreading probability p.
convenience of preventive immunization is just slightly more
pronounced. Moreover, one must consider that n(p) is only
the average fraction of saved individuals. Depending on the
specific realization of the epidemic process, the actual value
can be larger but also smaller. Only the immunization assum-
ing p = 1 is guaranteed to save a fraction nOP of the nodes.
Since the patterns observed assuming p = 1 (Fig. 2) are very
similar to those observed for p known a priori (Fig. 4), i.e. the
“informed” (and hence partial) immunization does not, on av-
erage, lead to the saving of a much larger number nodes than
those saved by the optimal percolation, the latter should be, in
general, preferred.
V. ON REAL-WORLD TOPOLOGIES
In this Section we check whether the same phenomenol-
ogy observed in synthetic networks also occurs in real-world
topologies, where correlations, clustering, mesoscopic struc-
tures add complexity to the picture. We consider an instance
of a small-world network with small diameter, an undirected
version of the World airline Network (WAN) [24]. The num-
ber of nodes is N = 3257, the average degree 〈k〉 ≈ 11.76
and the diameter is 12. We also consider the US power-grid
network [25], a quasi-planar graph with large diameter (46),
N = 4941 nodes and 〈k〉 ≈ 2.7.
We show the comparison between the quarantine strategy
and preventive immunization in Figs. 5.
The figure confirms the same qualitative behavior observed
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FIG. 5. (color online) Ratio between the fraction nQ of nodes saved by quarantine and the fraction of nodes nOP saved by preventive
immunization, as a function of the fraction of nodes removed. The topology is (a) WAN; (b) US power-grid. In the WAN topology (a) we
report both the results of the simulations implementing either the complete quarantine (dashed lines), or the improved one (solid lines). The
curves are for growing values (top to bottom) of the spreading probability p.
in synthetic networks. For small-world networks quarantine
becomes, almost immediately after the beginning of the out-
break, a less efficient strategy than preventive immunization.
For all the considered values of p, the observed R∗ values are
≈ 0.001 (i.e. ≈ 3 nodes), close to the analytical estimates
(≈ 0 nodes). In the case of the quasi-planar network instead
the dependence of nQ on R is almost linear and as a conse-
quence there is a finite (yet small) range ofR values for which
quarantine is more efficient than preventive immunization.
Also the comparison of quarantine with non intervention
(not shown) confirms the qualitative behavior observed in syn-
thetic networks.
VI. IMPROVED QUARANTINE STRATEGY
In the previous Sections we have seen that a post-outbreak
quarantine strategy is almost always less convenient (in terms
of saved individuals) than optimal preventive immunization.
So far, however, we have considered a crude quarantine strat-
egy, consisting in the removal of all susceptible neighbors of
infected individuals. This approach makes sense in many real
world situations, where the complete topology of the network
is not known a priori. For example, it is reasonable to quaran-
tine all people that have been exposed to a dangerous pathogen
because, in most cases, the structure of the social network
they belong to is not well known. However, in other situa-
tions where the topology is available, the complete quarantine
may not be the best strategy compared to a more parsimo-
nious approach aimed at avoiding the removal of a particular
node unless it brings benefit to other nodes. A trivial example
of such a situation is that of a healthy node completely sur-
rounded by infected neighbors. Removing the healthy node
from the network will not affect the probability of infection of
other uninfected nodes. Thus, rather than removing it from the
network, it would be more reasonable to leave it untouched,
hoping it remains uninfected.
General criteria for the identification of nodes that are not
to be quarantined may, however, be less self-evident. We con-
sider a simple one, based on the evaluation of Iq(Vq), i.e. the
number of nodes that will be, on average, reached by the in-
fection if the candidate Vq for quarantine is left untouched. If
this number is smaller than 1, quarantining Vq would lead to a
reduction in the number of saved individuals: hence it is more
convenient not to quarantine it.
For the independent cascade model with transmission prob-
ability p on a tree structure, the average number of nodes that
will be infected if a node Vq candidate to be quarantined is not
removed is
Iq(Vq) = p
z∑
l=1
plul. (5)
Here p is the probability that Vq actually becomes infected,
ul is the number of nodes at exactly l steps from Vq , and z
is the path length from Vq to the farthest uninfected node. If
Iq > 1, then Vq should be quarantined. Otherwise, leaving
Vq untouched would result, on average, in less than one node
being infected. Hence, a higher number of saved nodes is
obtained if Vq is not quarantined. On a network that is not
a tree, Eq. (5) is no longer exact. However, one can use it
as an approximation, provided that ul is computed after the
7exclusion from the network of all other nodes candidate for
quarantine, as well as of all removed (R) nodes. Moreover,
we can replace the first p factor with the probability pq =
[1 − (1 − p)nq ] that the infection is transmitted to Vq by one
of its nq infected neighbors.
As in the case of the “informed” preventive immunization,
Iq with p < 1 will provide information on the average ex-
pected effect of not quarantining a node, i.e. it will not ex-
clude the possibility that a much larger number of nodes than
the expected value is actually reached by the infection. Con-
servatively setting p = 1 allows for the identification of the
trivial cases of Vq nodes surrounded by infected nodes only.
Another limitation of this simple approach is that in non-
tree networks there will generally be an overlap among sets
of nodes protected by different Vq nodes. Especially for high
values of p, there could be situations where a high number
of Vq nodes are simultaneously protecting a small number of
healthy nodes. In such cases, Iq(Vq) will likely be greater than
1 for most of the candidates Vq , but quarantining all of them
will save a small number of nodes at the expense of removing
many. Avoiding the quarantine of all the Vq nodes that pro-
tect the same (small) set of healthy nodes could be the most
efficient strategy. A very simple procedure for taking this into
account is implemented by excluding from the network all in-
fected and removed nodes, and then counting the expected
number of Vq nodes that will be infected (i.e. the sum of their
pq values) in any network component. If that sum plus the
number of healthy nodes in the component is smaller than the
total number of Vq nodes in the component, no Vq nodes in
the component should be quarantined.
We tested the combination of these criteria on the WAN
topology. In Fig. 6 we show how the method substantially
reduces the number of nodes to be quarantined. In Fig. 5 we
show how this, although it translates into a net improvement
in the average fraction of nodes saved by the quarantine, does
not affect our main conclusion: preventive immunization is
still much more efficient than quarantine shortly after the first
infection.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have compared the efficiency of quaran-
tine protocols with respect to optimal prevention strategies
in terms of the number of individuals that remain unaffected
by the spread of the epidemic. We find that almost always
preventing is better than curing, unless the quarantine ap-
proach is applied in the very early stages of the spreading
process. The time window for quarantine to be convenient
is extremely short for topologies with small diameter (pos-
sessing the small-world property) and is further reduced if
the average degree is increased or the degree distribution is
broader. If quarantine is applied too late it may even become
more costly than leaving the to contagion evolve freely until
its spontaneous disappearance. Quarantine performs better in
networks with large diameter such as planar graphs and the
like. In such a case the number of infected nodes does not
grow exponentially with time and this makes the quarantine
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FIG. 6. Comparison of the number of nodes to be quarantined Q as
a function of R in the case of complete quarantine (dashed lines) or
improved quarantine (solid lines). Different panels refer to different
values of the spreading probability p. The topology is the WAN.
strategy relatively efficient for longer intervals.
These results provide a basic understanding of the salient
features of the problem. A number of limitations must, how-
ever, be clearly spelled out.
First, there are many epidemics where the infection can be
transmitted from one individual to another, even before symp-
toms permitting the identification of infection show up. For
example, in the case of vector-borne diseases, a newly infected
host may become able to transmit the disease to a vector be-
fore the signs of the disease become detectable. In such a sit-
uation, limiting the attention to the nearest neighboring nodes
could be not enough to ensure that the spread is stopped.
Second, the identification of the optimal percolating set re-
quires full knowledge of the contact network. If the topology
is not completely known it is impossible to immunize opti-
mally; conversely, quarantine is possible, as it requires only
local information. On the other hand, if the quarantine is
applied too late, it might be not only less efficient than pre-
vention, but also too resource demanding, as it requires the
simultaneous treatment of an exponentially large number of
individuals.
Finally, it will be interesting to lift the assumption that the
costs of being infected, immunized or quarantined are the
same. More realistic scenarios, where these costs differ (and
may even depend on the infection stage), may give rise to a
rich and interesting phenomenology.
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8APPENDIX A: IMMUNIZATION STRATEGY BASED ON
OPTIMAL PERCOLATION
The preventive immunization strategy is based on the con-
cept of optimal percolation, i.e. the identification of the small-
est possible set of nodes such that their removal splits the
whole topology into a set of mutually disconnected clusters
of nonextensive size. If nodes belonging to this optimal set
are removed, it is physically impossible for any outbreak to
reach a finite fraction of the network, so no global epidemic
is possible. To implement this approach we use the procedure
described by Morone and Makse [5]. We remove sequentially
one by one all nodes in the network based on their collective-
influence, which is recalculated at each step (using a radius
of 3, that is, considering in the computation all nodes within
three steps from the target node).
At any step t we take note of the number of nodes still
in the network (Nt) and of the size (Sq,t) of each connected
network component (q). In the case of an epidemic starting
from a random node in the network at step t, the probabil-
ity that a component q is infected is equal to Sq,t/Nt. If the
seed belongs to q, the number of nodes saved will be equal to
Nt−Sq,t. Thus, after removing t nodes, the expected number
Xt of saved nodes is
Xt =
∑
q
Sq,t
Nt
(Nt − Sq,t) = Nt
(
1−
∑
q S
2
q,t
N2t
)
. (6)
Xt will in general be low at the beginning of the immuniza-
tion, when the size of the largest connected component is still
very large. Then, it will increase until it reaches a maxi-
mum, representative of the best tradeoff between the number
of nodes removed, and the level of immunization reached. Af-
ter that optimal point, additional node removals will not lead
to an overall reduction of network components size (so that
Xt will decrease approaching 0).
We assume the number t∗ corresponding to the maximum
value of Xt as the number of nodes sacrificed by a preventive
immunization approach. Fig. 7 shows that this value t∗ almost
perfectly matches the value t¯ calculated via the usual criterion,
as the number of nodes to be removed such that the largest
connected cluster remaining is smaller than
√
N [21].
This indicates thatXt plays the role of susceptibility for the
optimal percolation transition.
The procedure just described guarantees that, after remov-
ing t¯ nodes, no outbreak can reach endemic proportions, even
in the worst case p = 1. If the spreading probability is smaller
than 1, however, the fraction of saved nodes will be on aver-
age n(p) larger than n(p = 1) = nOP . To determine this
quantity the procedure is the following. At step t (i.e. after t
nodes have been removed based on their collective influence),
some SIR simulations are performed and the average number
of saved nodes is computed. This quantity tends to grow with
t due to the immunization, but for larger t values it decreases
because of the node removal. The value of t corresponding to
the maximum sets the optimal value n(p) used in Fig. 2.
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FIG. 7. Scatter plot of t∗ vs t¯ for ER graphs with various 〈k〉 and
scale-free with γ = 3 and kmin = 3 (〈k〉 ≈ 5.01) showing that the
two quantities are almost identical. The solid line indicates perfect
equality.
APPENDIX B: ANALYTICAL EVALUATION OF R∗
In this Appendix, we present the details of the derivation
of Eq. (2), based on the heterogeneous mean-field (HMF) the-
ory for SIR [26]. Alternative approaches based on message-
passing [27] or branching processes [28] would be possible.
We define as Sk (respectively, Ik, Rk) the density of nodes
of degree k which are in state S (I, R, respectively) at time
t. The total fraction of nodes in state S is S =
∑
k P (k)Sk
(analogous formulas hold for the other states). For simplicity,
we omit the explicit indication of the time dependence, where
not needed. For continuous dynamics [defined by the param-
eters µ (rate of spontaneous recovery) and β (rate of infection
through an edge connecting a node in state I with a node in
state S)] the evolution of the densities is, within the HMF ap-
proximation, given by
S˙k = −βkSkΘ (7)
I˙k = −µIk + βkSkΘ (8)
R˙k = µIk , (9)
where
Θ =
1
〈k〉
∑
k
P (k)(k − 1)Ik (10)
is the probability that an edge points to an infected vertex and
is capable of transmitting the disease. By rescaling the time
unit it is possible to set µ = 1 with no loss of generality. The
form of the equations guarantees the conservation of the total
probability Sk + Ik + Rk = 1. The initial condition with a
single infected node implies Sk ≈ 1, I ≈ 0, Rk = 0.
Multiplying the equation for Ik by P (k)(k − 1)/ 〈k〉 and
9summing over k we obtain
Θ˙ = −Θ + βΘ 1〈k〉
∑
k
P (k)(k − 1)kSk. (11)
For sufficiently short times one can assume Sk ≈ 1, so that
Θ˙ = −Θ + βΘ
(〈
k2
〉
〈k〉 − 1
)
=
Θ
τ
. (12)
The temporal scale
τ =
〈k〉
β 〈k2〉 − (β + 1) 〈k〉 (13)
governs the exponential growth (or decay) of Θ, depending
on whether β is larger or smaller than the threshold βc =
〈k〉 /(〈k2〉− 〈k〉).
By integrating Eq. (12) and inserting the result Θ(t) =
Θ(0)et/τ into the equation for Ik we get
I˙k = −Ik + βkΘ(0)et/τ , (14)
which can be integrated yielding
Ik(t) = Ik(0)e
t/τ , (15)
where Ik(0) = kΘ(0) 〈k〉 /(
〈
k2
〉− 〈k〉).
By integrating the equation for Rk [Eq. (9)] we obtain
Rk =
∫ t
0
dt′Ik(t′) = Ik(0)τ(et/τ − 1) ≈ τIk, (16)
so Ik = Rk/τ .
The quarantine procedure consists in removing from the
system all infected nodes and all their susceptible neighbors.
For infected nodes of degree k this means removing (k−1)Ik
nodes; the factor k− 1 accounts for the fact that one neighbor
of an infected node is the node that transmitted the infection to
it, therefore it cannot be susceptible. Hence the global fraction
of nodes which are left after the quarantine procedure is
nQ =
∑
k
P (k)[1−Rk−Ik−(k−1)Ik] = 1−R−
∑
k
P (k)kIk
(17)
The last term on the right hand side in Eq. (17) can be rewrit-
ten, by considering the temporal evolution of Ik [Eq. (15)],
as ∑
k
P (k)kIk = I
〈
k2
〉
〈k〉 , (18)
which, inserted into Eq. (17) and using R = τI , yields the
expression for the total fraction of nodes nQ saved by a quar-
antine applied when the number of recovered nodes is R:
nQ(R) = 1−
(
1 +
1
τ
〈
k2
〉
〈k〉
)
R. (19)
It is important to note that this expression holds for short
times and on locally tree-like networks (otherwise the expres-
sion (k−1)Ik for the number of neighbors of nodes of degree
k to be quarantined is overestimated).
In order to compare with simulation results performed us-
ing the Independent Cascade Model, we notice that HMF the-
ory provides an epidemic threshold which is only approximate
for continuous time SIR but is exact for the ICM [1]. Exploit-
ing this correspondence, we assume the validity of Eq. (19) for
ICM dynamics, provided β is replaced with the probability p
in Eq. (13) for τ .
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